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INTRODUCTION
In October 2012, the United States Supreme Court heard oral
arguments in Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin and again faced the
question of whether colleges and universities can consider race as a factor
in admissions decisions to benefit minorities and enhance diversity.1 As
was true when the Court last considered this issue in Grutter v. Bollinger2
in 2003, the central question for the Justices was whether colleges and
universities have a compelling interest in having a diverse student body.3
As I read the paper by Martin Redish and Mathew Arnould, 4 I wondered
how they would have the Court go about answering that question.
Ultimately, the issue comes down to a value choice by the Justices: Is
diversity in the classroom a compelling government interest? Yet Redish
and Arnould say that we should not have a system where “judges are
allowed to insert their own values in place of democratically sanctioned
choices.”5 But how can a judge possibly decide whether diversity is a
compelling interest without making a value choice? The text of the
Fourteenth Amendment and its assurance of equal protection do not
provide an answer. The original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment
offers no clear resolution, at least in terms of whether diversity is a
compelling interest. Nor do I see how Redish and Arnould’s “controlled
activism” offers an alternative to the Justices simply having to decide
 Dean and Distinguished Professor of Law, University of California, Irvine School of Law.
1. 631 F.3d 213 (5th Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 1536 (Feb. 12, 2012).
2. 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (holding that colleges and universities have a compelling interest in
having a diverse student body and may consider race as a factor in admissions decisions to enhance
diversity).
3. See Fisher, 631 F.3d at 216–18.
4. Martin H. Redish & Matthew B. Arnould, Judicial Review, Constitutional Interpretation,
and the Democratic Dilemma: Proposing a “Controlled Activism” Alternative, 64 FLA. L. REV.
1485 (2012).
5. Id. at 1522.
1539
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whether colleges and universities have a sufficiently important interest in
diverse student bodies.
This example is telling because it is so typical. In constitutional cases
involving equal protection or individual rights, courts always have to
decide whether, depending on the level of scrutiny, there is a “legitimate,”
or an “important,” or a “compelling” government interest. The answer to
this question can never be found in the text of the Constitution and rarely,
if ever, from the Constitution’s original meaning. The Court has never
articulated criteria for deciding what is a “compelling” or an “important”
interest. It is simply a value choice that Justices and judges have to make.
There are many places where the text of the Constitution requires that
judges at all levels make value choices. The Fourth Amendment, for
example, prohibits “unreasonable” searches and seizures. But there is no
way to decide what is reasonable based on the text of the Fourth
Amendment and there is rarely a way to decide what is reasonable based on
its original meaning. Nor does the controlled activism approach proposed
by Redish and Arnould provide a method to answer this.
Redish and Arnould say that the debate over constitutional
interpretation is between two approaches: originalism and nontextualism.
They do a masterful job of pointing out the flaws of each. They then say
that they have a better alternative: controlled activism.
In this response, I want to make three points: First, Redish and Arnould
set up a straw person by defining the alternative methods of constitutional
interpretation as being a choice between originalism and nontextualism.
Second, Redish and Arnould seek an impossible goal: avoiding judicial
value choices in constitutional interpretation. Their controlled activism
approach, like all approaches, fails to avoid these value choices. Finally, I
suggest that the underlying problem with Redish and Arnould’s analysis is
the one that plagues so much of constitutional theory: It asks the wrong
questions.
I. A FALSE CHOICE
Redish and Arnould begin with the premise that there are two leading
approaches to constitutional interpretation: originalism and nontextualism.
They state: “[A]t the risk of oversimplification, it is reasonable to posit
predominant the existence of two major theoretical camps: originalism and
nontextualism.”6 Originalism is the view that the Constitution’s meaning
was fixed when it was adopted and can be altered only by constitutional
amendment and not by interpretation. Redish and Arnould explain the
various versions of originalism, but all are united by a view that the judges
in interpreting the Constitution are confined to ascertain and follow its
original meaning.
6. Id. at 1487.
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The alternative model, according to Redish and Arnould, is espoused
by “those scholars and jurists who believe that the Constitution’s text
should not restrict the judiciary in the exercise of the judicial review
power.”7 They say that “at its core nontextualism represents either a form
of linguistic deconstruction—what we term ‘linguistic chaos’—or the
notion of an ‘unwritten’ constitution grounded in foundational moral
premises drawn from one or another form of natural law.”8
Redish and Arnould persuasively show how both of these two
alternatives are unacceptable. But the problem with their analysis is that
they have set up a straw person by presenting these as the two competing
theories of constitutional interpretation. Neither reflects what the Supreme
Court has ever done in constitutional decision making. Few Justices in
history other than Justices Antonin Scalia or Clarence Thomas have been
originalists, and even they tend to be originalists only when it serves their
purposes. For example, there is a very strong argument that the original
meaning of the Equal Protection Clause was to allow race-conscious
programs to benefit minorities.9 Yet Justices Scalia and Thomas ignore this
in consistently voting to invalidate all affirmative action programs. Along
the same lines, it is difficult to see how the original meaning of the First
Amendment was to allow corporations to spend unlimited amounts of
money in election campaigns.10
In fact, often the Supreme Court has expressly rejected originalism. In
Home Building & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, almost eighty years ago, the
Court declared:
It is no answer to say that this public need was not
apprehended a century ago, or to insist that what the provision
of the Constitution meant to the vision of that day it must
mean to the vision of our time. If by the statement that what
the Constitution meant at the time of its adoption it means today, it is intended to say that the great clauses of the
Constitution must be confined to the interpretation which the
framers, with the conditions and outlook of their time, would
have placed upon them, the statement carries its own
refutation. It was to guard against such a narrow conception
that Chief Justice Marshall uttered the memorable warning—
“We must never forget that it is a constitution we are
expounding” . . . “a constitution intended to endure for ages to
come, and consequently, to be adapted to the various crises of
7. Id. at 1512.
8. Id.
9. See Stephen A. Siegel, The Federal Government’s Power to Enact Color-Conscious
Laws: An Originalist Inquiry, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 477, 479–80 (1998).
10. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 899, 924–25 (2010) (holding that corporations
have the right to spend unlimited sums in independent expenditures in election campaigns).
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human affairs.” When we are dealing with the words of the
Constitution, . . . “we must realize that they have called into
life a being the development of which could not have been
foreseen completely by the most gifted of its begetters. . . .
The case before us must be considered in the light of our
whole experience and not merely in that of what was said a
hundred years ago.”11
Similarly, in Brown v. Board of Education, the Court stated:
In approaching this problem, we cannot turn the clock back to
1868 when the Amendment was adopted, or even to 1896
when Plessy v. Ferguson was written. We must consider
public education in the light of its full development and its
present place in American life throughout the Nation. Only in
this way can it be determined if segregation in public schools
deprives these plaintiffs of the equal protection of the laws.12
This, of course, is not to deny the role of originalism among
conservative scholars and Justices. But it is a mistake to believe that the
Supreme Court has consistently followed originalism over the course of
American history.
Nor do the Justices or many scholars, however, endorse what Redish
and Arnould term nontextualism. Where the text is clear, virtually all agree
that it has to be followed. The Constitution requires two Senators from
each state13 and that the President be at least thirty-five years old14 and that
there be a two-thirds vote of the Senate to ratify a treaty.15 I cannot think of
an instance where a Justice said that a textual provision can be ignored, and
few scholars take the radical deconstructionist position that Redish and
Arnould identify as the alternative to originalism.
In fact, the example that Redish and Arnould give of the Court ignoring
the text of the Constitution, the Eleventh Amendment, does not support
their conclusion.16 They are right, of course, that the text of the Eleventh
Amendment only keeps a state from being sued by citizens of other states
and citizens of foreign countries. But the Supreme Court has said that it is
a larger principle of sovereign immunity, of which the Eleventh
Amendment is only a part, that precludes states from being sued by their
own citizens.17 In other words, even in this instance, the Supreme Court is
11. 290 U.S. 398, 442–43 (1934) (internal citations omitted).
12. 347 U.S. 483, 492–93 (1954).
13. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3.
14. Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 5.
15. Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
16. Redish & Arnould, supra note 4, at 1523.
17. See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 748–49 (1999) (holding that states cannot be
sued in state court because of a larger principle of sovereign immunity).
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not ignoring the text of the Constitution—it is supplementing it by finding
in the Constitution’s structure a principle of state sovereign immunity. I
share the view of Redish and Arnould that this is wrong, but not because it
ignores the text of the Constitution; it is wrong because state sovereign
immunity is inconsistent with the more important value of government
accountability.18
Redish and Arnould argue that Bolling v. Sharpe,19 which held that
equal protection applies to the federal government through the Fifth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause, is “textually impermissible.”20 They
are right, of course, that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection
Clause applies only to state and local governments. But they never explain
why it is impermissible to read the Due Process Clause as including a
requirement for equal protection. In fact, if their approach to constitutional
interpretation means that equal protection does not apply to the federal
government, that, by itself, would make it unacceptable. Neither Justices
nor scholars should accept an approach to constitutional interpretation that
leads to such an undesirable result as the federal government being
unconstrained by any requirement of equal protection.
The Supreme Court has never said that it is ignoring the text of the
Constitution or engaging in the radical deconstruction that Redish and
Arnould describe as nontextualism. Few scholars endorse it. Virtually all
agree that there are clear provisions of the Constitution and that these
should be followed, though these provisions are rarely the ones that lead to
litigation; the Supreme Court is virtually always dealing with the opentextured provisions of the Constitution.
My point is that neither originalism nor nontextualism explains what
the Supreme Court has actually done throughout American history. By
presenting these as the two competing models of constitutional
interpretation, Redish and Arnould create a pair of straw persons that they
then masterfully demolish. What has the Court done in deciding
constitutional cases? Throughout American history, the Court has
considered text, original understanding (if it can be discovered), tradition,
precedent, and contemporary values and needs. This is how the Court
decided Brown v. Board of Education,21 a case that I assume Redish and
Arnould applaud; and Roe v. Wade,22 a case that Redish and Arnould
believe was wrongly decided.23 In Roe, the Court followed decades of
18. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Against Sovereign Immunity, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1201, 1202
(2001).
19. 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954) (holding that equal protection applies to the federal government
through the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment).
20. Redish & Arnould, supra note 4, at 1524.
21. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
22. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
23. Redish & Arnould, supra note 4, at 1532.
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precedent in holding that privacy is a fundamental right implicit in the
word liberty in the Due Process Clause and explained why laws prohibiting
abortion infringed this right.24 In almost every case, there is no clear,
determinate answer to constitutional questions; the Justices look at
multiple sources and decide what they believe the Constitution means.
They are following neither originalism nor nontextualism. Redish and
Arnould begin with a false premise as to the competing methods of
constitutional interpretation.
II. THE INEVITABILITY OF VALUE CHOICES
A central aspect of Redish and Arnould’s objective is developing an
approach to constitutional interpretation that minimizes judges’ making
value choices in interpreting the Constitution. They say in their
introduction, “If we ultimately conclude that neither the Constitution’s text
nor its history restrains unrepresentative, unaccountable judges in checking
the actions of the political branches of either federal or state governments,
little will be left of our system of popular sovereignty.”25 They decry
“situation[s] in which judges are allowed to insert their own values in place
of democratically sanctioned choices.”26
But as Redish and Arnould recognize, the text rarely provides answers
in constitutional cases before the Supreme Court, and the search for an
original meaning is futile and misguided. That has been so throughout
American history and yet “our system of popular sovereignty” has
survived. As they acknowledge, there is often no choice but for the Justices
to make value choices. They write: “To the extent not prohibited by the
modest exclusionary textualism filter imposed by our model, we cede to
the reviewing court a significant degree of discretion to shape
constitutional interpretation in accord with what they deem normatively
preferable values. We cede this authority, because there exists no real
alternative.”27
I completely agree. In this sentence, they concede that the premise
stated in their introduction—that popular sovereignty cannot survive
judicial value imposition—is just wrong. They concede that judges
inescapably will “insert their own values in place of democratically
sanctioned choices.”28
But they are not comfortable with this conclusion, so they develop a
further theory which they “label Level I and Level II forms of normative

24. I defend the reasoning of Roe in ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, THE CONSERVATIVE ASSAULT ON
THE CONSTITUTION 170–71 (2010).

25.
26.
27.
28.

Redish & Arnould, supra note 4, at 1586.
Id. at 1522.
Id. at 1530–31.
Id. at 1521.
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inquiry.”29 They say that “it is solely the Level I form of normative analysis
that is properly vested in the unaccountable judiciary.”30 I confess that I
struggled to understand the difference between these two forms of
normative analysis. They say that a “court employing Level II analysis asks
only how its chosen constitutional interpretation of a particular provision
alters the political topography in the manner most consistent with the
chosen sub-constitutional political or ideological preferences.”31 They say
that “[u]nder a Level II approach, therefore, constitutional interpretation
amounts to nothing more than a strategic extension of the interpreter’s
political agenda.”32
By contrast, they say that “[w]hile Level I analysis authorizes
normative discretion, the normative inquiry applies solely to a
determination of the values deemed to underlie a linguistically ambiguous
constitutional provision, divorced from the judge’s narrow, personal
political preferences or assessment of immediate political consequences.”33
They say that in following this approach, “courts may choose from a
variety of plausible interpretations of numerous constitutional provisions.
But in doing so, they must choose an underlying value framework which is
both linguistically plausible and grounded in considerations that are
something other than naked political or ideological precepts.”34
The problem with the Redish and Arnould approach is that it assumes
that it is possible to identify the underlying value of a constitutional
provision or reason from it without the Justice’s ideology playing a crucial
role. Put another way, every Justice believes that he or she is engaged in
what Redish and Arnould call Level I analysis. Every Justice, in every
case, believes that she is identifying the values underlying an ambiguous
constitutional provision and reasoning from it; no Justice believes that she
is just imposing a political agenda. Every judicial opinion is written in this
way. No Justice believes that she is basing decisions on “naked political or
ideological precepts.” Under the Redish and Arnould approach, we can call
the decisions we don’t like “impermissible” Level II reasoning, but the
Justices and the defenders of their opinions will say that they were engaged
in the Level I approach. There is no way to tell the difference between a
decision that is based on the Justices reasoning from values they find
underlying constitutional provisions and a decision that is based on the
Justices’ imposition of their own values in the Constitution’s name.

29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Id. at 1531.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1532.
Id. at 1533.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2012

7

Florida Law Review, Vol. 64, Iss. 6 [2012], Art. 2

1546

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 64

Redish and Arnould give three examples of cases that they believe
exemplify impermissible Level II analysis35: District of Columbia v.
Heller,36 Roe v. Wade,37 and Lochner v. New York.38 But all three can be
seen as exercises of Level I analysis. In Heller, the Court engaged in a
“determination of the values deemed to underlie a linguistically ambiguous
constitutional provision.”39 The Second Amendment’s text is an enigma; it
says: “A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free
State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be
infringed.”40 What is the relationship between the first half of the
provision, which seemingly states its purpose, and the second half that
states the right? What does “militia” mean? What does “keep and bear
arms” mean? The Court in interpreting this provision said that the
provision’s underlying value was to allow people to have arms in their
homes for the purpose of self-protection.41 This seems exactly what Redish
and Arnould say that Level I analysis entails. Of course, the reason the
majority reads this as the purpose, but the dissent does not, is the
ideological difference between the Justices. We are at a time in history
when conservatives believe that the Second Amendment protects a right of
individuals to have guns, but liberals do not. But that points to the
incoherence of trying to separate Level I from Level II analysis; inevitably
the values that a Justice finds underlying a constitutional provision are a
product of that Justice’s views and ideology.
Roe v. Wade is no different. The Court interpreted the word liberty in
the Due Process Clause as protecting the right to privacy.42 This was not a
radical notion. The Court has protected aspects of autonomy under the
liberty of the Due Process Clause since the early twentieth century. Among
other rights, the Roe Court noted, the Court has found that the Due Process
Clause protects a right to marry, a right to procreate, a right to custody of
one’s children, a right to control the upbringing of one’s children, and a
right to purchase and use contraceptives.43 In other words, the Court found
that a value underlying the ambiguous word liberty was personal autonomy
in crucial life decisions. The Court in Roe reasoned from this to say that

35. Id. at 1532.
36. 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
37. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
38. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
39. Redish & Arnould, supra note 4, at 1532.
40. U.S. CONST. amend. II.
41. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 584–86.
42. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 152–53.
43. See id. (citing Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (contraception); Loving v.
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (marriage); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (custody and
care of children); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (procreation); Pierce v. Soc’y of
Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (control over upbringing)).
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laws prohibiting abortion infringed the right to privacy.44
Ultimately, the Court had to decide whether the State’s claimed interest
in protecting fetal life and pregnant women’s health justified the law
forbidding abortion.45 But this inevitably entailed a value choice by the
Justices.
Again, the Court’s approach in Roe seems a paradigm of what Redish
and Arnould call Level I analysis. It is easy for critics to say that the Court
was engaging in no more than imposing its own values and thus really was
taking a Level II approach. Under the Redish and Arnould model, we will
all call the decisions we do not like “Level II reasoning.” But other than
giving us a new way of describing decisions with which we disagree,
Redish and Arnould have accomplished little.
Even Lochner v. New York can be defended as an exercise of Level I
analysis. The Court interpreted the ambiguous word liberty in the Due
Process Clause as including freedom of contract.46 In other words, to use
the words of Redish and Arnould, the Court determined “the values
deemed to underlie a linguistically ambiguous constitutional provision.”47
The Court in Lochner stated: ‘‘The general right to make a contract in
relation to his business is part of the liberty of the individual protected by
the Fourteenth Amendment. . . . The right to purchase or to sell labor is
part of the liberty protected by this amendment.’’48 The Court did exactly
what Redish and Arnould call for: It candidly identified the value that it
saw underlying a linguistically ambiguous constitutional provision and
reasoned from it.
Redish and Arnould say that “a judge could disguise her Level II values
as part of what purports to be a Level I inquiry.”49 But this misses the
point: Level I analysis, by Redish and Arnould’s own admission, requires
that Justices identify the values underlying a constitutional provision.
Inescapably, this is a product of the Justice’s own values and ideology.
Every Justice believes that he or she is engaged in Level I analysis and
every opinion is written this way. We just call the ones we do not like
“Level II,” much like people use “judicial activism” to label the decisions
they do not like.
Moreover, even after the Court identifies a right, it still has to decide
whether the government has a sufficient interest in interfering with it.
Depending on the level of scrutiny, the Court must decide whether there is
a “legitimate” or “important” or “compelling” interest. Inevitably—as

44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

See id.
See id. at 162–63.
See Lochner, 198 U.S. at 54.
Redish & Arnould, supra note 4, at 48.
Lochner, 198 U.S. at 53.
Redish & Arnould, supra note 4, at 1534.
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argued in the Introduction—this requires a value choice, and the distinction
between Level I and Level II offers no assistance.
III. WRONG QUESTIONS YIELD WRONG ANSWERS
Almost thirty years ago, Professor Bruce Ackerman observed that
“[h]ardly a year goes by without some learned professor announcing that
he has discovered the final solution to the countermajoritarian difficulty,
or, even more darkly, that the countermajoritarian difficulty is insoluble.”50
Redish and Arnould have now offered their effort to do so.
Like so much of the constitutional theory of the last half century, they
seek to minimize judicial value imposition and expressly endorse
constitutional decision making based on “neutral principles.”51 But there is
no way to avoid judges having to make value choices. Is a sentence of life
in prison with no possibility of parole for the crime of shoplifting $153
worth of videotapes “cruel and unusual punishment”?52 Are clergydelivered prayers at a public school graduation a violation of the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment?53 Is the government’s
interest in preventing corporate wealth from distorting the election process
a sufficiently compelling interest to justify restricting independent
expenditures by corporations in elections?54
All of these examples, and they are typical of constitutional cases,
require that the Justices make value choices. There is no alternative.
Constitutional theories, like that of Redish and Arnould, are developed to
try to prevent or limit Justices from doing so. If the question is, can we
devise an acceptable method of constitutional interpretation that does not
rest on judicial value imposition, the answer will be, never.
The inquiry is not only futile—it is destructive. The discussion should
be about the content of the values and how they should be applied in
particular cases. What was wrong with Lochner and Heller was not that
they rested on value choices by the Justices, but that the Court chose
wrongly. That is the conversation we should be having—a substantive
conversation about the content of the values and how they should be
50. Bruce A. Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93 YALE L.J.
1013, 1016 (1984); see also Ronald Dworkin, The Forum of Principle, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 469, 516
(1981) (“We have seen an extraordinary amount of talent deployed to reconcile judicial review and
democracy.”); Gerald Gunther, Some Reflections on the Judicial Role: Distinctions, Roots, and
Prospects, 1979 WASH. U. L.Q. 817, 828 (“There is an outburst of writing about legitimate modes
of constitutional interpretation and about limits on judicial subjectiveness and open-endedness.”).
51. Redish & Arnould, supra note 4, at 1534.
52. See Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 76 (2003) (denying habeas corpus relief for this
sentence as a violation of the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment).
53. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 598–99 (1992) (holding that clergy-delivered prayers
in public school graduations violate the Establishment Clause).
54. See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 924–25 (2010) (holding that corporations
have the right to spend unlimited sums in independent expenditures in election campaigns).
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applied. Focusing on methodology, and Level I and Level II analysis, is an
undesirable diversion that keeps us from focusing on the real questions that
should be discussed and debated.
Over twenty years ago, I wrote: “Ultimately, the decisions must be
defended or criticized for the value choices the Court made. There is
nothing else.”55 Of course, Redish and Arnould are right that the text of the
Constitution must be followed. They are correct that original meaning
cannot be the basis for decisions. But they err when they try to develop
their own approach for limiting judicial value imposition.
CONCLUSION
There will always be something uncomfortable about unelected judges
striking down the choices of elected government officials. But judicial
review is based on the assumption that as a society we are better off having
judges who are largely insulated from majoritarian politics deciding the
meaning of the Constitution and being able to strike down the acts of the
other branches of government. When judges do this, they must make value
choices. Any attempt to deny this—whether it is called originalism, or
Level I and Level II analysis, or neutral principles—is doomed to fail and
keeps us from focusing on the real questions: What values are protected by
the Constitution, and how should they be applied?

55. Erwin Chemerinsky, The Supreme Court, 1988 Term—Foreword: The Vanishing
Constitution, 103 HARV. L. REV. 43, 104 (1989).
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